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Article 4

Comment: What Level of Intent is Required to Prove
Inequitable Conduct?
A patent is a legal instrument with which an inventor can protect
his investment of money and effort in an invention. The inventor, by
fully disclosing his invention to the government, 1 receives the right to
exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention within the
United States. 2 In essence, a patent represents a contract between the
United States and the inventor. 3 The government's contract power
stems from the Constitution, 4 which authorizes Congress "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and Useful Arts, by securing for a limited time
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries. " 5 The primary purpose of this constitutional provision
is not to reward the individual, but to promote science for the "general
welfare of the nation." 6 The public, therefore, has a high interest in
seeing that the patent process is free from fraud. 7
Because of the significant public interest in the patent system, both
patent applicants and their attorneys owe an uncompromising duty to
report to the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") all
facts relevant to the patent process. A person who violates this duty
may be charged with "inequitable conduct," the specific term for fraudulent procurement of a patent. 8 A patent obtained through inequitable
conduct is unenforceable. 9 As a result, inequitable conduct is often an
affirmative defense in patent infringement suits. A defendant, by claiming that the patentee procured the patent through inequitable conduct,
1. 35 l'.S.C. § 112 ( 1982)
2. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 135 (1969).
3. See, e.g., Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 218, 241-42 (1832).
4. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S 1, 5 (1965).
6. Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S 327. 330-31 (1945).
7. See True Temper Corp. v. CF & I Steel Corp., 601 F.2d 495, 501 (10th Cir. 1979)(patent applicant stands in a confidential relationship to the PTO and has an absolute duty of full and
complete disclosure to help the Office in developing patent claims).
8. See Precision lnstr. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 818 ( 1945 ).
When a patent applicant fails to uphold his duty of candor and good faith, and procures a patent
by withholding material information from, or submitting false information to the PTO, the applicant is said to have procured his patent through inequitable conduct or fraud on the PTO.
9. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984), rert. denied,
474 U.S. 822 (1985). A finding of inequitable conduct may also result in criminal punishment of
culpable parties, and there is a possibility of liability under antitrust laws. A discussion of these
potential liabilities is beyond the scope of this comment.
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may avoid liability for his patent infringement. Additionally, in ex
parte proceedings, the PTO has invalidated patents due to inequitable
conduct where the patent practitioner has breached his duty of candor
to the Patent Office. 10
Courts today impose a greater burden of proof upon a party seeking to prove inequitable conduct than did courts of a decade ago. In
order to prove inequitable conduct, two elements must be shown: 1)
materiality of information, and 2) intent to mislead. However, courts
disagree upon the amount of proof required to satisfy each of these
elements, particularly with respect to intent to mislead. In two recent
cases, 11 the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
("CAFC"), significantly raised the threshold level of proof required to
show intent to mislead the PTO. These CAFC decisions hold that
proof of gross negligence, without proof of actual intent to mislead, is
insufficient to meet the intent threshold for a finding of inequitable
conduct. This new standard has altered the PTO's approach to inequitable conduct problems. 12
The recent CAFC decisions establish a standard of proof for inequitable conduct that is more consistent with the primary purposes of
patent law. This comment first examines the evolution of inequitable
conduct from its common law fraud origin into a standard that encouraged litigation and prompted courts to focus predominantly on the
actions of the patentee rather than on the merits of the patentee's invention. Second, it examines the development of the new heightenedintent standard, a standard that both effectively reduces the number of
inequitable conduct claims that will be raised in court, and changes the
focus of many patent cases to one concentrating on the merits of the
invention. Finally, it concludes that the recent CAFC decisions establish a standard of proof for inequitable conduct that will prevent fraud
on the PTO and, at the same time, promote useful art and technology,
I 0. Grounds upon which findings of inequitable conduct have been found include: I) misrepresentations in patent applications oaths or declarations, see, e.g., Walker Process Equip., Inc. v.
Food Mach. & Chern. Co., 382 U.S. 172 (1965); 2) misrepresentations in affidavits, see, e.g.,
Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chern. Co., 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983); 3) misrepresentation or
inadequate disclosure of prior art or other information, see, e.g., Penn Yan Boats, Inc. v. Sea Lark
Boats, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 948 (S.D. Fla. 1972), affd, 479 F.2d 1329 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 874 (1973); 4) nondisclosure of material prior art, see, e.g., Argus Chern. Corp. v. Fibre
Glass-Evercoat Co., Inc., 759 F.2d 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 5) non-disclosure of evidence of prior
public use and sale, see, e.g., Walker Process Equip. Inc. v. Food Mach. Co., 382 U.S. 172
(1965).
II. See FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987); In Re Harita, 847
F.2d 801 (Fed. Cir. 1988). These decisions are discussed in detail, see infra text accompanying
notes 64-90.
12. See infra text accompanying notes I 02 to 106 for the PTO's most recent policy changes
regarding inequitable conduct.
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thus furthering the primary purposes of the patent system.
I.

BACKGROUND - THE EvoLUTION oF THE INEQUITABLE
CoNDUCT DocTRINE

A. Merging Common Law Fraud and the Doctrine of "Unclean
Hands"
Common law fraud exists when the following elements are proved:
( 1) a representation of a material fact; (2) the falsity of that representation; (3) the intent to deceive or, at least, a state of mind so reckless as
to the consequences that it is held to be the equivalent of intent (scienter); (4) justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation by the party
deceived which induces him to act thereon; and (5) injury to the party
deceived as a result of his reliance on the misrepresentation. 13 The first
patent legislation in the United States, the Patent Act of 1790, allowed
individuals to sue for cancellation of a fraudulently procured patent. 14
However, this private right of action was removed from the statute by
the Patent Act of 1836. 1 ~ From that time until 1933, only suits by the
government to cancel a fraudulently procured patent were recognized. 16
In 1933, the Supreme Court, in Keystone Driller Co. v. General
Excavator Co., 17 allowed equitable relief to a private individual defendant in a patent infringement action based on a fraudulently procured patent. The Court's reasoning incorporated the equitable doctrine
of "unclean hands," which forbids equitable relief to one who has acted
in bad faith. 18 This doctrine originally developed in the English courts
of chancery and paralleled the development of the doctrine of fraud in
the common law courts. 19 The standard of conduct necessary to secure
a remedy under each of the doctrines is essentially the same. 20
In 1945, the U.S. Supreme Court established fraud in patent pro13. W. Kt:t:TON, D. DoBBS, R. Kt:t:TON & D. OwEN, PRossER AND KEETON oN ToRTS§§
100-05 (5th ed. 1984); 37 C.JS. Fraud § 3 (1943)
14. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1 Stat. 109, 111. This provision was also carried forth in
the Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 10, 1 Stat. 318, 323.
15. See Patent Art of 1836, ch. 357, § 16, 5 Stat. 117, 123. See also Rubber Co. v. Goodyear,
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788, 797 (1870)("[T]he intention of Congress [was] not to allow a patent to be
abrogated in any collateral proceeding .
.")
16. See, e.g., Mowry v. Whitney, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 434 (1871)(action to cancel a patent by
private individual denied even though patent was procured by means of a fraud); United States v.
American Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 370 (1888)( government has a "duty to correct this evil, to
recall these patents, to get a remedy for this fraud . . . . ").
17. 2'!0 us 240 (1933)
18. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 940 (1979).
19. Ram, Patent Fraud: A New Defense?, 54 J PAT. OFF. Soc'v 363, 365 (1972).
20. /d. at 365-66.
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curement as a defense to charges of patent infringement. 21 This defense
was not used extensively, however, until 1965, when the Supreme
Court, in Walker Process Equipment, Inc v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 22 held that a patent procured by fraud was an illegal monopoly that could be the basis of an antitrust action under section two
of the Sherman Act. 23
The analyses of early cases examining the duty of disclosure to the
PTO merged common law fraud and the equitable doctrine of unclean
hands. 24 The pioneer case discussing these issues was Norton v. Curtiss. 211 In Norton, the Court of Custom and Patent Appeals affirmed a
decision of the Commissioner refusing to strike an application under
the then applicable version of PTO Rule 56. 26 The court based its
analysis upon the five element common law fraud standard. 27 The
court then modified certain of those elements to fit the patent law context, merging the doctrines of fraud and unclean hands. 28 It concluded
that "[a] court might still evade the evidence in light of the traditional
elements of technical fraud, but will now include a broader range of
21. Precision Instr. Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945).
22. 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
23. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
24. See, e.g., Norton v. Curtiss, 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970); In re Clark, 522 F.2d 623
(C.C.P.A. 1975). Such a duty exists because of the ex parte nature of patent prosecution and the
public interest in ensuring that only valid patents issue.
25. 433 F.2d 779 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
26. 35 C.F.R. § 1.56 ( 1970). The rule at that time provided:
56. Improper applications. Any application signed or sworn to in blank, or without
actual inspection by the applicant, and any application altered or partly filled in after
being signed or sworn to, and also any application fraudulently filed or in connection
with which any fraud is practiced or attempted on the Patent Office, may be stricken
from the files.
!d. (emphasis added).
27. 433 F.2d at 793. The court first noted that "traditionally, the concept of fraud has most
often been used by the courts, in general, to refer to a type of conduct so reprehensible that it
could alone form the basis of an actionable wrong . . ." !d. at 792.
28. /d. at 793. The court explained:
But the term "fraud" is also commonly used to define that conduct which may be raiser\
as a defense in an action at equity for enforcement of a specific obligation. In this
However, in
context, it is evident that the concept takes on a whole new scope.
these situations, failure, for one reason or another, to satisfy all the elements of the
technical offense often will not necessarily result in a holding of "no fraud." Rather the
courts appear to look at the equities of the particular case and determine whether the
conduct before them--which might have been admittedly less than fraudulent in the
technical sense-was still so reprehensible as to justify the court's refusing to enforce
the rights of the party guilty of such conduct. It might be said that in such instances

the concept of fraud becomes intermingled with the equitable conduct of "unclean
hands."

/d. (emphasis added.)
The elements of common law fraud modified by the court included materiality, intent, and
injury. /d. at 794-96.
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conduct within each of those elements, giving consideration to the equities involved in the particular case." 29 Thus, the court relaxed the fraud
requirement actions dealing with patent procurement. However, the
court retained the rigid intent element of fraud, explaining that "[ t ]he
state of mind of the one making the representations is probably the
most important of the elements to be considered in determining the existence of fraud." 30
Even though the Norton decision merged the doctrines of unclean
hands and fraud to achieve a more workable fraud standard of proof
for patent cases, there were numerous conflicts regarding the intent requirement and the duty to disclose. 31 Many courts had held that the
inequitable conduct defense required both knowledge and intent to conceal.32 Other courts had held that a patent may be invalid regardless of
this intent. 33 In 1977, the PTO attempted to resolve these conflicts by
promulgating rules based on existing office policy regarding fraud and
inequitable conduct, which the PTO found consistent with the then
prevailing case law in the federal courts. 34 Rule 1.56 made punishable
both affirmative misrepresentations 311 and "material" omissions 36 in
patent procurement. It was felt that Rule 1.56 would have a stabilizing
effect on future decisions and that it would also offer guidance to the
29. !d.
30. !d. at 795.
31. See Markey, The Phoenix Court, 10 AIPLA Q.J. 227, 233 (1982).
32. See, e.g, Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Riverton Laboratories, Inc., 433 F.2d 1034 (2nd Cir.
1970); Benger Laboratories, Ltd. v. R.K. Laros, Co., 317 F.2d 455 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 833.
33. See, e.g., Dale Electronics, Inc. v. R.C.L. Electronics, Inc., 488 F.2d 382 (1st. Cir. 1973);
Union Carbide Corp. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 550 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1977).
34. See Duty of Disclosure; Striking of Applications, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (a), (d) (1978), which
provides:
(a) A duty of candor and good faith toward the Patent and Trademark Office rests on
the inventor, on each attorney or agent who prepares or prosecutes the application, and
on every other individual who is substantively involved in the preparation or prosecution of the application and who is associated with the inventor, with the assignee or
with anyone to whom there is an obligation to assign the application. All such individuals have a duty to disclose to the Office information they are aware of which is material
to the examination of the application. Such information is material where there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent. The duty is commensurate
with the degree of involvement in the preparation of prosecution or the application .

• ••

(d) An application shall be stricken from the files if it is established by clear and convincing evidence that any fraud was practiced or attempted on the Office in connection
with the application, or in connection with it or that there was any violation of the duty
of disclosure through bad faith or gross negligence.

!d.
35. See id. § 1.56(d).
36. See id. § 1.56(a)
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courts. 37 However, the rule did not stabilize the standard for proving
inequitable conduct, and the wording of the rule has been widely criticized for vagueness. 38 Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit faced the challenge of clarifying patent laws and resolving conflicts
between courts, and between the courts and the PTO.

B.

The Establishment of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit was formed in 1982
by merging the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of
Claims. Congress established the CAFC as a court with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all patent cases on appeal from the federal district courts. 39 It was expected that uniformity and reliability in the interpretation and application of patent law would result, and that forum
shopping among the circuits would cease.' 0 While the CAFC has established uniformity in many areas of patent law, it has not yet reached a
consensus as to the bounds and parameters of prohibited conduct before
the United States Patent and Trademark Office concerning both ex
parte and inter partes matters. 41 For this reason, until recently the
standard of proof for inequitable conduct, especially with respect to the
intent element, remained an area of enormous uncertainty to attorney
and client alike. The most recent CAFC decisions involving inequitable
conduct have done much to dispel this uncertainty.' 2
37. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL
2010 (Rev. 3, May 1986).

OF

PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §

38. See Proposed Resolution 403-1 on Duty of Disclosure, ABA SEc. PAT., TRADEMARK &
CoPYRIGHT L. CoMM. REP., 252, 253 (1988); Resolution 502-1 on Duty of Disclosure, ABA
SEC. PAT., TRADEMARK & CoPYRIGHT L. CoMM. REP., 67, 68 (1987); Adamo & Ducatman,

The Status of the Rules of Prohibited Conduct Before the Office: "Violation of the Duty of Disclosure" Out of "Inequitable Conduct" by "Fraud", 68 ]. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 193, 205 n.l4
(1986).
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982). When jurisdiction in the district court rested wholly or in part
on the patent portion of 28 U.S.C 1338 (1982), or on certain subsections of 28 U.S.C. 1346 (1982)
not relating to taxes, the judgements in those cases are appealable exclusively to the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit also has jurisdiction over appeals from the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (1985). However, after an adverse
decision from the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, the dissatisfied applicant may alternatively sue the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia; the decision must thereafter be appealed to the Federal Circuit. 35
U.S.C. § 145 (1982)
40. S. Rt:P. No. 275, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1982), reprinted in, 1982 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS II, 14.
41. The reason for this lack of consensus is not due to the infrequency of addressing the issue
of inequitable conduct. The CAFC has addressed inequitable conduct extensively. See infra table
accompanying notes 91 to 102.
42. See generally infra text accompanying notes 61 to 111.
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Application of the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine in the CAFC

In its early decisions, the CAFC adopted the modified five element
prima facie standard of inequitable conduct articulated in Norton v.
Curtiss. 43 In Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 44 the court further delineated
the standard:
Fraud must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, and the party
asserting it carries a heavy burden .... The intent element offraud,

however, may be proven by a showing of acts the natural consequences of which are presumably intended by the actor. Statements
made with gross negligence as to their truth may establish such intent . ... The duty of candor owed the PTO being uncompromising, it
would deal a deathblow to that duty if direct proof of wrongful intent
were required. At the same time, that something thought to be true
when stated, or a piece of prior art thought unimportant to the PTO's
decision, was later determined to have been untrue or important, will
not automatically and alone establish that fraud or inequitable conduct occurred.

***
Where one who knew, or should have known, that a piece of prior
art, or other information, would be material, i.e., important to the
PTO in making its decision, a failure to disclose that art or information can be sufficient proof that a wrongful intent exi~ted to mislead
the PTO, and may result in a finding of what has come to be called
"fraud" on the PTO!~

The court did not deviate from this standard until early 1984, in
the case of American Hoist & Derrick v. Sowa & Sons, Inc. 46 Judge
Rich abandoned the Norton v. Curtiss standard and announced a balancing test comprising the elements of materiality and intent. The court
stated that the jury must first decide whether the level of intent is convincing. Next, the court will balance intent in light of materiality to
determine, as a matter of law, whether fraud on the PTO occurred. 47
43. See, e.g., Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144, 1151-52 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376, 1383-84 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
44. 719 F.2d 1144 (Fed Cir. 1983).
45. /d. at 1151-52 (emphasis added).
46. 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984).
47. /d. at 1363-64. The court stated:
The jury must also determine how convincing has been the proof of intent, if at all. It
should, therefore, be instructed that it may find a showing on this element to be lacking
entirely or that it may find intent to have been shown by any relevant degree of
proof-from inference to direct evidence, i.e., from gross negligence or recklessness to a
deliberate scheming.
The considerations here are distinct from fraud as a common law cause of action. In
the latter instance, it is usual that a jury can render a verdict for plaintiff by answering
affirmatively the factual questions of (I) knowing (2) misrepresentation or omission (3)
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The following graph more clearly represents the American Hoist balancmg process:
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The vertical axis shows the range of intent and the horizontal axis
shows the range of materiality. First, the trier of fact must determine
whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that the defendant's
conduct reaches the threshold levels of materiality and intent. 48 If both
of a material ("important" or "inducing") fact, (4) intent, and (5) reliance by the party
deceived (6) to his damage. It need only answer "yes" to these fact questions to find
fraud.
Here, however, because an applicant's misrepresentation or failure to meet his "duty to
disclose to the Office information
which is material" will not in itself render a
patent invalid or unenforceable, see 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) and (d), "fraud" may be determined only by a careful balancing of intent in light of materiality. The result of
that balancing is obviously not a fact that may be found to exist or not, nor is it a mere
matter of application of the law to the facts, both normal jury functions. It requires that
judicial discretion be brought to bear, and the district court shall decide it.
/d. (emphasis added).
Confirmation that the Norton standard no longer ruled in the Federal Circuit came in Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878, 884-85 (Fed. Cir. 1984)(proof of reliance was not an element of
"fraud on the Patent Office").
48. The American Hoist Court found the threshold level of materiality to be misconduct
which "might reasonably have affected the examiner's decision as to patentability." American
Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1362. This interpretation of materiality is similar to PTO Rule 56(a), which
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thresholds are satisfied, then the court will decide, as a matter of law,
whether inequitable conduct occurred in light of materiality and intent.
A lessor degree of materiality requires a greater degree of intent. In
contrast, a lessor degree of intent is required where the information has
a great degree of materiality. 49 In essence, the summation of materiality
and intent is used so that a large amount of one and a small amount of
the other equal a sum which exceeds what may be considered the inequitable conduct boundary. 60
The balancing test has been used by the CAFC since American
Hoist, and is still alive today.~ The American Hoist test has been criti1

provides that information "is material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a
patent." 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a). This standard has also been applied in subsequent cases. See, e.g.,
J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 822 (1985); FMC v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Note that
application of this standard has not been absolute. See, e.g., Carella v. Starlight Archery, 804 F.2d
135 (Fed. Cir. 1986)(information not material unless there is a clear showing that prior art would
impact the determination of obviousness); Rolls Royce Ltd. v. GTE Valeron Corp., 800 F.2d 1101
(Fed. Cir. 1986)(without looking for any other threshold for materiality the court found that a
"merely cumulative" reference is not material).
The American Hoist court implied that threshold level of intent would at least be gross negligence. This threshold level of intent dropped to a simple negligence standard in subsequent cases
and, more recently, has been raised to something close to an actual intent to deceive. See infra text
accompanying notes 61 to 64.
The CAFC did not formally announce "threshold" levels as part of its analysis until J.P.
Stevens. Stevens, 747 F.2d at 1559. However, threshold levels of intent and materiality were
present in American Hoist and continue today. Cf. Wegner, Inequitable Conduct and the Proper
Roles of Patent Attorney and Examiner in an Era of International Patent Harmonizatiort, 16
AlP LA Q.J. 38, 62 ( 1988)(declaring that the CAFC's holding in Manitowoc abandons th'e balancing test and replaces it with a rebuttable three-element test).
It is also significant to note that the standards for both materiality and intent continue to be
criticized and recently several proposals to change rule 56 were made. Patent and Trademark
Office Proposals to Modify Rules 56 and 97-99, 16 AIPLA Q.J. 96 (1988). Efforts to,modify
Rule 56 were finally abandoned in October 1988, when the PTO decided that it would no longer
investigate patent applications for inequitable conduct under Rule 56. See infra notes 102 to 106.
49. See Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1455 (Fed. Cir.
1984)("wrongful intent may lower the materiality requirement."). In a way this is not really a
balancing test. Materiality and intent are not balanced against each other but rather weighed
together; it is clear that inequitable conduct may be found when both materiality and intent exist
in a high degree. See, e.g., In Re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The "balancing test"
seems simply to reserve the ultimate judgment to the courts.
50. This boundary is determined by the courts using their sense of equity. See American
Hoist, 725 F.2d 1350, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1984)("1t requires that judicial discretion be brought to
bear .
.").
51. See Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorf£ Licensing, Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387, 1394 (Fed. Cir.
1988); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Hycor Corp. v.
Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529, 1537-41 (Fed. Cir. 1984 ); Merck & Co., Inc. v. Biocraft Laboratories, Inc., 690 F.Supp. 1376, 1376 (D.N.J. 1988); H. B. Fuller Co. v. National Starch and Chern.
Corp., 689 F.Supp. 923, 932-34 (D. Minn. 1988); Edwards v. Weinburger, 688 F. Supp. 203,
217 (E.D. Vir. 1988).
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cized by some commentators because its parameters and application
vary greatly from case to case. 112 It is easy to establish a standard using
the important elements that must be considered; it is much more difficult to get that test to fit all situations involving inequitable conduct.
However, even wide variances in the test's application seem consistent
with Judge Rich's requirement that "judicial discretion be brought to
bear .... " 113 By balancing materiality and intent the courts are allowed
more discretion, which is proper for courts deciding cases which turn
on equitable principles. 114

D.

The Demise of Intent as an Element of Inequitable Conduct

Inequitable conduct, unlike fraud, does not require a showing of
bad faith as part of the "intent" element. 1111 The intent element of inequitable conduct has been satisfied by a showing of "gross negligence,"
which the CAFC defines as the failure to act as a "reasonable person,"
one who should have known of the materiality of a withheld reference.116 For example, a reasonable person should know that "important" prior art should be disclosed. Therefore, the intent element is satisfied by merely showing that the omitted prior art was important. 117
52. See, e.g, Lynch, An Argument for Eliminating the Defense of Patent Unenforceability
Based on Inequitable Conduct, 16 AlP LA Q.J. 7, 12 ( 1988). To see just how varying the application of the American Hoist test can be, see KangaROOS U.S.A., lnr. v. Caldor Inc., 778 F.2d
1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Haworth, Inc. v. Steelcase, Inc., 685 F. Supp 1422 (W.D. Mich. 1988).
53. American Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1364.
54. For a discussion of the incorporation of these equitable principles into the inequitable
conduct defense, see supra notes 24 to 31 and accompanying text.
55. Argus Chern. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., Inc., 759 F.2d 10, 14 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
56. J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Ltd., 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1985). The court held
that "[p]roof of deliberate scheming is not needed; gross negligence is sufficient. Gross negligence
is present when the actor, judged as a reasonable person in his position, should have known of the
materiality of the withheld reference. On the other hand, simple negligence, oversight, or an erroneous judgment made in good faith, is insufficient. /d. at 1560 (citations omitted). It is interesting
to note that even though the court specifically stated that simple negligence was not enough to
constitute inequitable conduct, its definition of gross negligence seemed to include simple negligence. Negligence is commonly understood to mean failure to act as a reasonable person would
have acted in the same or similar circumstances. Gross negligence, on the other hand, is great
negligence, that requires willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct, or evidence of utter lack of all
care. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965); 57 AM. jt:R. 2D ]'v'egfigence § 99
(1971); 65 C.J.S. Negligence§ 8(4)(1966); W. KEETON, D. DoRRS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 34 (5th ed. 1984 ). See also Machinery Corp
of America v. Gullfiber AB, 774 F.2d 467, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1985)(court stated with respect to gross
negligence that, "The gross negligence standard has been defined as requiring willful, wanton, or
reckless misconduct, or evidence of 'utter lack of all care.'"); Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740
F.2d 1529, 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
57. Argus Chern. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Even·oat Co., Inc., 759 F.2d 10 (Fed. Cir.
1985)(court found the requisite intent to establish inequitable conduct because Argus's attorney
should have known the importance of the withheld information). More recently the CAFC has
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The relaxing of the intent requirement to a mere showing of gross
negligence has caused inequitable conduct to become a popular defense.118 The CAFC has often been willing to find inequitable conduct
where the district court had rejected the defense. From the 1982 inception of the CAFC through 1988, the court wrote twelve opinions in
favor of the accused infringer on the issue of inequitable conduct. Eight
of those decisions were reversals of the district court's finding that inequitable conduct did not exist, and four affirmed the district court's findings of inequitable conduct. 119
Inequitable conduct, a charge that challenges the integrity of the
patentee and his attorney, would seem to be an area of law similar to
fraud where an appellate court gives more deference to the rulings of
the District Court as compared to other non-fraud issues. But until
recently, the opposite has been true. 60
Not only has the number of inequitable conduct claims increased
in recent years, but additionally the focus of trials involving inequitable
conduct issues has switched from trials primarily concerned with the
abandoned this approach. Cf Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087, 1095
(Fed. Cir. 1987)(good faith belief that certain prior art was not material is sufficient to overcome a
charge of inequitable conduct).
58. This popularity stems directly from the lowered intent standard, since historically the
intent requirement in a fraud defense had been one of the elements most difficult to prove. The
relaxed standard has prompted commentators to urge CAFC practitioners to liberally use the
inequitable conduct defense. See generally Schwab, Defending a Patent Case Under the Watchful
t.ye of the Federal Circuit, 70 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 100 (1988).
59. See infra chart accompanying notes 91 to 102.
60. One author has published staggering numbers. He says that the reversal rate on decisions
favoring the alleged infringers involving inequitable conduct is SOo/o and that in decisions not involving inequitable conduct, the reversal rate is less than 10%. See Schwab, 70 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v
at 105, 108. Another author suggests more conservative numbers. He wrote:
[A]n examination of the Federal Circuit rulings on inequitable conduct issues shows
that, in the overwhelming majority of such cases, no inequitable conduct was found.
The trial court's finding of no inequitable conduct was upheld in twenty-one cases and
reversed only four times. A lower court finding of inequitable conduct is generally only
found where, 'but for' the withholding of the information, the claims in issue would
clearly not have issued or where there is very strong non-circumstantial evidence of a
deliberate intent to deceive.
Pearson, How To Keep Your Hands Clean - The Developing U.S. Law On Inequitable Conduct
In Patent Prosecution, 92 lNTELL PROP. J. 91, 99-100 (1987). The CAFC has recently resolved,
in an en bane decision, that "inequitable conduct is committed to the discretion of the trial court
and is reviewed by this court under an abuse of discretion standard." Kingstown Medical Consultants v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867, 876 (Fed. Cir. 1988). This resolution will ultimately reduce
these reversal rates on inequitable conduct issues.
Assuming that the 10% reversal rate suggested by Mr. Schwab is correct, the more conservative numbers show that reversal rates involving inequitable conduct issues are double non-inequitable conduct issues. For an independent analysis in the CAFC's reversal rate on inequitable
conduct, see infra text accompanying notes 91 to 102. Based on these numbers, it is not difficult to
understand why so many inequitable conduct charges are raised.
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merits of an invention to trials primarily concerned with the ethics or
morals of those involved in prosecuting the patent. 61 As a result, many
courts have emphasized discouraging dishonest conduct in dealing with
the PTO, but at the expense of encouraging invention and dissemination to the public, the primary purposes of the patent system. 62 To establish a standard that encourages litigation and deflects the attention
of the court away from the merits of an invention, the primary purposes of the patent system are unnecessarily compromised. 63
II.

THE IMPACT OF RECENT CAFC DECISIONS ON THE ELEMENT
OF INTENT

A. The Return of Intent as One of the Two Elements zn a Prima
Facie "Violation of Duty" Case
In two recent decisions, the CAFC again began to require a
greater showing of intent to mislead before finding that inequitable
conduct occurred. In both FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 64 and In re
Harita, 66 the CAFC modified the intent threshold by raising the required level of proof of intent to mislead the PTO from gross negligence to an actual intent to mislead. 66 These decisions will have a longlasting effect on the manner in which the PTO deals with inequitable
conduct. Perhaps more importantly, the decisions reflect a concern
noted by many judges that the inequitable conduct defense is overused,
wastes resources, and frustrates the primary purposes of the patent
61. See generally, Chism, Patent Law and the Presumption of Moral Regularity: A Critical
Review of Recent Federal Circuit Decisions on Inequitable Conduct and Willful infringement, J.
PAT OFF. Soc'v 27 (1987).
62. The CAFC has, in some cases, been aware of this overemphasis and their decisions reflect a desire to reduce it. See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chern., 722 F.2d 1556, 1571
(Fed Cir. 1983) which said:
Surely a very important policy consideration is to disclose all manner of dishonest conduct in dealing with the PTO. At the same time, the basic policy underlying the patent
system is to encourage the disclosure of inventions through issuance of patents. Another
policy of the system is to stimulate the investment of risk capital in the commercialization of useful patentable inventions so that the public gets some benefit from them,
which may not occur in the absence of some patent protection. Clearly, we are faced

with questions of both socioeconomic policy on the one hand, and morals or ethics on
the other. We think we should not so emphasize either category as to forget the other.
ld. (emphasis added)
63. It is the author's contention that these policies are not mutually exclusive; that a standard
for inequitable conduct exists which will allow discouragement of fraud in the PTO while encouraging disclosure of inventions.
64. 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
65. 847 F.2d 801 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
66. One other case that fits into this category is FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836
F.2d 521 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In Hennessy, the CAFC held that the non-disclosure of facts of facts of
an "on sale" wds not sufficient to satisfy the inequitable conduct defense.
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system. 67

1.

FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co.

a. Background. FMC filed suit against Manitowoc for a declaratory judgment that its heavy lift cranes did not infringe Manitowoc's
patent and that Manitowoc's patent was invalid. 68 FMC also alleged
that Manitowoc's threatened enforcement of the patent constituted unfair competition because "FMC was forced to 'design around' [a] patent procured through inequitable conduct." 69 The charge that alleged
the patentee had not disclosed information that constituted prior art
publication. At trial, the patent owner presented evidence that he did
not believe that the information in question constituted art that required disclosure. Based on this evidence, the trial court found that the
patentee lacked intent to mislead the PT0. 70
b. The CAFC' s reasoning. Chief Judge Markey devoted most of
his opinion to the issue of inequitable conduct and ultimately established when the invocation of an inequitable conduct claim is proper.
The court stated that:
"Inequitable conduct" is not, or should not be, a magic incantation to
67. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp. 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
The Dayco court noted:
We add one final word: the habit of charging inequitable conduct in almost every major
patent case has become an absolute plague. Reputable lawyers seem to feel compelled
to make the charge against other reputable lawyers on the slenderest grounds, to represent their client's interests adequately, perhaps. They get anywhere with the accusation in but a small percentage of the cases, but such charges are not inconsequential on
that account. They destroy the respect for one another's integrity, for being fellow
members of an honorable profession, that used to make the bar a valuable help to the
courts in making a sound disposition of their cases, and to sustain the good name of the
bar itself. A patent litigant should be made to feel, therefore, that an unsupported
charge of "inequitable conduct in the Patent Office" is a negative contribution to the
rightful administration of justice. The charge was formerly known as "fraud on the
Patent Office," a more pejorative term, but the change of name does not make the thing
itself smell any sweeter. Even after complete testimony the court should find inequitable conduct only if shown by clear and convincing evidence. A summary judgment that
a reputable attorney has been guilty of inequitable conduct, over his denials, ought to
be, and can properly be, rare indeed.
/d. See also Kimberly-Clark v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437, 1454 (Fed. Cir.
1984)(" 'Fraud in the PTO' has been overplayed, is appearing in nearly every patent suit, and is
cluttering up the patent system.").
68. Manitowoc, 835 F.2d at 1412. The challenged patent was U.S. Patent No. 3,485,383
('383)
69. Manitowoc responded by initiating a separate suit against FMC for infringement, and
FMC counterclaimed for antitrust violations. The cases were consolidated in this action, but the
only issue discussed here is the inequitable conduct claim.
70. /d. at 1415.
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be asserted against every patentee. Nor is that allegation established
upon a mere showing that art or information having some degree of
materiality was not disclosed. To be guilty of inequitable conduct, one
must have intended to act inequitably. Thus, one who alleges a "failure to disclose" form of inequitable conduct must offer clear and convincing proof of: (1) prior art or information that is material; (2)
knowledge chargeable to applicant of that prior art or information
and of its materiality; and (3) failure of the applicant to disclose the
art or information resulting from an intent to mislead the PT0. 71

Judge Markey explained that this proof may be rebutted by a
good faith showing that the applicant's failure to disclose art or information did not result from an intent to mislead the PT0. 72 The court
applied the American Hoist balancing test, but added an interesting
twist; it held that "[ t]he level of materiality may be high or low ... ",
but the "[a]pplicant must be chargeable with knowledge of the existence of the prior art or information, for it is impossible to disclose the
unknown." 73 The court further weakened the gross negligence standard
by stating that
an applicant who knew or should have known of the art or information, and of its materiality, is not automatically precluded thereby
from an effort to convince the fact finder that the failure to disclose
was nonetheless not due to an intent to mislead the PTO; i.e., that, in
light of all the circumstances of the case, an inference of intent to
mislead is not warranted. 74

The court strengthened the notion that subjective good faith will
cure a suspected inequitable conduct charge. 711 In essence, it established
71. !d.
72. /d. The court stated that:
That proof may be rebutted by a showing that: (a) the prior art or information was not
material (e.g. because it is less pertinent than or merely cumulative with prior art or
information cited to or by the PTO); (b) if the prior art or information was material, a
showing that applicant did not know of that art or information; (c) if applicant did
know of that art or information, a showing that applicant did not know of its materiality; (d) a showing that applicant's failure to disclose art or information did not result
from an intent to mislead the PTO.

/d.

73. /d.
74. /d. at 1416.
7 5. The court reasoned that:
No single factor or combination of factors can be said always to require an inference of
intent to mislead; yet a patentee facing a high level of materiality and clear proof that it
knew or should have known of that materiality, can expect to find it difficult to establish "subjective good faith" sufficient to prevent the drawing of an inference of intent to
mislead. A mere denial of intent to mislead (which would defeat every effort to establish inequitable conduct) will not suffice in such circumstances. Nonetheless, when, as
here, the district court finds, on all the evidence, that an applicant had no knowledge of
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that once it is shown the applicant should have known of the materiality of certain information, the burden of proof as to intent to mislead
the PTO shifts to the applicant. The applicant may then successfully
challenge the claim by showing that he acted in good faith with no
knowledge of the art's materiality.

2.

In Re Harita

a. Background. Mr. Harita and five other employees of Kissei
Pharmaceutical Co., a Japanese company, are the inventors listed for a
patent issued in 1976. 76 The patent was filed by an American patent
attorney on behalf of Kissei's patent attorney, Mr. Agata. Mr. Agata
later received notice of an action by the French patent office which
cited a reference 77 that disclosed compounds within the scope of the
claims of the U.S. application. He notified Kissei, which made a further search and found other prior art on which the U.S. claims relied.
When Kissei asked Mr. Agata whether the additional prior art should
be called to the attention of the United States PTO, he replied that it
should not. 78 After the patent issued, Kissei learned that Mr. Agata's
advice had been wrong. They took steps to file a reissue application
through new U.S. attorneys. 79
In 1979, the pending reissue application was referred to the special program examiner at the PTO. After four and a half years of additional investigation, the program examiner rejected certain of the claims
on the sole ground that Mr. Agata did not disclose the newly discovered
art to the PTO before the patent issued. He based his decision on PTO
Rule 1.56(d). 80
Harita appealed the special program examiner's finding of inequitable conduct to the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which
materiality, that that lack of knowledge was not due to gross negligence, and that applicant had no intent to mislead the PTO, the burden on an appellant attempting to
overturn those findings is not met by mere argument that undisclosed art or information known to the applicant was material.
/d.

76. In re Harita 847 F.2d 801, 804 (Fed. Cir. 1988). The patent claimed "a group of compounds useful for treating asthma, hay fever, etc." /d.
77. /d. (citing CHEMICAL ABSTRACTS Vol. 71 No 3354V (1969).
78. Harita, 847 F.2d at 804.
79. /d. at 805. The ground for reissue was that the patent was "inoperative", within the
meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 251 (1982), to protect the invention "by reason of the patentee claiming
more ... than he had a right to claim in the patent".
80. /d. at 806. Rule 56(d) provides that "an application shall be stricken from the record if it
is established by clear and convincing evidence that any fraud was practiced or attempted on the
Office in connection with it or that there was any violation of the duty of disclosure through bad
faith or gross negligence." 37 C.F.R § 1.56(d) (1977).
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affirmed the finding by simply adopting and attaching the examiner's
brief to it's short opinion. 81 Harita then appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.
b. The CAFC's reasoning. The CAFC emphasized that its decision was fact specific and that the standard of inequitable conduct that
should be applied is the standard existing at the time the original patent issued. 82 The court stated that the only issue in this case is whether
the PTO established that the Japanese attorney, Mr. Agata, had an
intent to mislead the PTO. The Court concluded that although the
Board found that Mr. Agata had been grossly negligent in his failure to
report the prior art to the PTO, such a vague concept should not, without more, imply an intent to mislead. It reversed the prior decisions of
the PTO because, in its view, an intent to mislead had not been adequately proved. 83 Judge Rich stated, "[w]e think we should not infer
merely from some vague thing called 'gross negligence' an intent which
it was the PTO's obligation to establish and especially that we should
not infer it in light of detailed rules of procedure enacted long after the
events in this case took place." 84 In making these conclusions, it referred to the court's previous decision in FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc. 85
The court also found that for Mr. Agata to be guilty of inequitable
conduct, he must have intended to act inequitably. 86
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Davis stated that Mr. Agata was
guilty of at least gross negligence and therefore inequitable conduct.
The American patent attorney prosecuting the original patent application before the PTO wrote two letters to the Japanese attorney, "each
cautioning that a newly-found (but prior) disclosure of a compound
within the scope of the application's claims would invalidate those
claims." 87 Such material claims became known to Mr. Harita, but he
told the inventors that it was not necessary to call that prior art to the
attention of the PTO. He also knew that a voluntary amendment (correcting a claim that had been too broadly or inartfully drafted) was
permissible in the U.S. patent practice.
81 See Fx Parte Harita, 1 USPQ 2d 1887 (U.S. Pat. Off. 1987); Harita, 847 F.2d at 803.
82. /d. at 807. The court stated that its decision was made "with no intent whatsoever to
create a precedent applicable to different fact situations." Although setting precedent was not the
intention of the court, the case created a strong precedent, as evidenced by the PTO's attention to
Harita. See infra text accompanying notes 106-111.
83. !d. at 808.
84. !d. at 809.
85. 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See supra, notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
86. The court based this conclusion on the language in Manitowoc, !d. at 1415. (" 'Inequitable conduct' is not .
some magic incantation to be asserted against every patentee . . . . To be
guilty of inequitable conduct, one must have intended to act inequitably'').
87. Harita, 847 F.2d. at 810.
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To Judge Davis, Mr. Agata's conduct amounted to gross negligence, "at the very least." 88 He stated that " '[g]ross negligence' is one
form of inequitable conduct specified in the July 1982 Patent rule embodied in 37 C.F.R § 1.56(d), and this court has accepted that foundation for showing the proper measure of intent, especially where, as
here, there is a high level of materiality." 89 By balancing materiality
and intent, both of which he found to exist in high measures, Judge
Davis concluded that inequitable conduct occurred when Mr. Agata
failed to disclose the reference. 90

B.

The Effect of FMC and Harita

Both FMC and Harita require the party alleging inequitable conduct to bring forth evidence that proves an actual intent to mislead the
PTO. This approach raises the required threshold level of intent from
the gross negligence standard to proof nearer an actual intent to
deceive. 91 The immediate effect of these decisions will be to substantially increase the burden on those charging a patentee with fraud. The
long-term effect will be litigation that is more consistent with the purposes of the patent system. 92
Based purely on statistics, the CAFC has not been hospitable to
inequitable conduct charges. 93 (See the table below.) 94
88. !d.
89. !d. Judge Davis also explained that in 1975-76 the basis for finding inequitable conduct
included gross negligence, and that precedent suggests that the later versions of Rule 56 generally
embody the PTO policy as it earlier existed. See In re Clark, 522 F.2d 623. 627 (C.C.P.A. 1975);
Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878 (1984)
Judge Davis' dissent is persuasive in that it followed CAFC precedent, absent the FMC
decision. The CAFC adopted the precedents of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and
indicated that it would not overrule applicable precedents except by en bane consideration. South
Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1982)(en bane). Both FMC and
Harita were decided by three-judge panels. However, the en bane decision affirming these inequitable conduct decisions in Harita and FMC was not long in coming. In Kingstown Medical Consultant v. Hollister, Inc., 863 F.2d 867 (Fed. Cir. 1988), the court in a separate part of the
decision made a "Resolution of Conflicting Precedent" and held that " 'gross negligence' does not
of itself justify an inference of intent to deceive; the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the
evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith, must indicate sufficient culpability to require
a finding of intent to deceive." !d. at 876.
90. Harita, 847 F.2d at 811 (citing In re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886, 891 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
91. By referring to the graph, see supra text accompanying notes 47-50, one can see that
this effectively reduces the area, i.e. the number of inequitable conduct cases, in which the CAFC
will find inequitable conduct.
92. For the practical effects of Harita and Manitowoc, see infra text accompanying notes
108-111.
93. Statistics, however, do not tell the full story. For a more meaningful analysis, one must
make a qualitative, not merely a quantitative analysis. This comment shows that the threshold
level of intent has increased from what may be considered a 'simple negligence' standard to somewhere near an 'actual intent to mislead' standard. This substantively demonstrates that the CAFC
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CAFC Decisions on Inequitable Conduct
Number of Cases
Number Reversed Percent, %
involving Inequitable
By CAFC
Conduct
Where Lower Court or Agency
Found Inequitable Conduct
Since 1982 (Beginning of
CAFC):
1988:
Inequitable Conduct Issue
Raised But Lower Court or
Agency Rejected
Since 1982 (Beginning of
CAFC):
1988:
TOTAL

18

3

33

90

13

96

72

97

3

98

100

99

7'""

21

2102

25

8'"'
51

21

is less hospitable to fraud as compared to previous years.
94. Note that the table only takes into account published opinions through 1988 that address
inequitable conduct on appeal to the CAFC. Inequitable conduct is alleged in many cases but is
rejected in most of them. See Dunner, Inequitable Conduct: Is the Sky Falling? 16 AIPLA Q.J.
27, 28-29 (1988)(lnequitable conduct charges are rejected 75o/o of the time at the district court
level and 91% of the time at the PTO.
95. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorf[ Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Harita, 847 F.2d 801
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 822 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Gardco Mfg. Inc. v. Herst Lighting
Co., 820 F.2d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1987); A.B. Dick Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 798 F.2d 1392 (Fed.
Cir. 1986); In re Jerabek, 789 F.2d 886 (Fed. Cir. 1986); KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor,
Inc., 778 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d
1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985); State Indus., Inc. v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 769 F.2d 762 (Fed. Cir. 1985);
Korody-Colyer Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 760 F.2d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Litton Indus.
Prod., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In reMark Indus., 751 F.2d
1219 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984); American Hoist & Derrick
Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chern
Co., 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
96. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Harita, 847 F.2d 801
(Fed. Cir. 1988); Baker Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Jaskiewicz v. Mossinghoff, 822 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1987); KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc. v. Caldor,
Inc., 778 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1985); State Indus., Inc. v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 769 F.2d 762 (Fed.
Cir. 1985); Litton Indus. Prod., Inc. v. Solid State Sys. Corp., 755 F.2d 158 (Fed. Cir. 1985); In
reMark Indus., 751 F.2d 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Kimberly-Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson,
745 F.2d 27 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Hycor Corp. v. Schlueter Co., 740 F.2d 1529 (Fed. Cir. 1984);
American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Rohm &
Haas Co. v. Crystal Chern Co., 722 F.2d I 556 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
97. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorff Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Harita, 847 F.2d 801
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
98. Demaco Corp. v. F. Von Langsdorf[ Licensing Ltd., 851 F.2d 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1988);
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Harita, 847 F.2d 801
(Fed. Cir. 1988).
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Through 1988, the CAFC has heard appeals on issues concerning
inequitable conduct in 51 cases. The reversal rate in cases where the
lower court or agency found inequitable conduct is 72%. In cases where
the lower court or agency rejected allegations of inequitable conduct,
the CAFC's reversal rate is only 21%. 103 This indicates that the
chances of a reversal following a trial court's finding of inequitable conduct are significantly greater than reversing a finding of no inequitable
conduct.
99. Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp. 859 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir.
1988); A.B Chance Co. v. RTE Corp. 854 F.2d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1988); E.!. Dupont De Nemours
& Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430 (Fed Cir. 1988); Buildex Inc. v. Kason Indus.,
Inc., 849 F.2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elec .. Inc., 847 F.2d 819 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Grain Processing
Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co., 840 F.2d 902 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball lnt'l, Inc., 839 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988); FMC Corp. v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 836 F.2d
521 (Fed. Cir. 1987); FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co., 835 F.2d 1411 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Under Sea
Indus., Inc. v. Dacor Corp., 833 F.2d 1551 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Sweats Fashions. Inc. v. Pannill
Knitting Co., 833 F.2d 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Perini Am., Inc. v. Paper Converting Mach. Co.,
832 F.2d 581 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087 (Fed.
Cir. 1987); Argus Chern. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1987); NV
Akzo v. E.!. Dupont de Nemours, 810 F.2d 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Carella v. Starlight Archery
and Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v. Carson Prod. Co., 803 F.2d 676
(Fed. Cir. 1986); Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp., 800 F.2d 1111 (Fed.·
Cir. 1986); Kloster Speedsteel AB v. Crucible, Inc., 793 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Laitram
Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co., 785 F.2d 292 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Argus Chern. Corp. v. Fibre
Glass-Evercoat Co., 759 F.2d 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens
Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Atlas Powder Co. v. E.!. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
750 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Inc., 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir.
1984); Driscoll v. Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir. 1984 ); Kahle v. Dart Indus. Inc., 726 F.2d 724
(Fed. Cir. 1984); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chern Co., 722 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1983);
Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542 (Fed. Cir. 1983); W.L. Gore & Assoc., Inc. v.
Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Kansas Jack, Inc. v. Kuhn, 719 F.2d 1144 (Fed.
Cir. 1983); Environmental Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co., 713 F.2d 693 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Orthopedic Equip. Co. v. All Orthopedic Appliances, Inc., 707 F.2d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
100. A.B Chance Co. v. RTE Corp. 854 F.2d 1307 (Fed. Cir. (1988); Buildex Inc. v. Kason
Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Argus Chern. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co.,
759 F.2d 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613
(Fed. Cir. 1985); J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Lex Tex, Inc., 747 F.2d 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Driscoll v.
Cebalo, 731 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chern Co., 722 F.2d 1556
(Fed. Cir. 1983)
101. Smithkline Diagnostics, Inc. v. Helena Laboratories Corp. 859 F.2d 878 (Fed. Cir.
1988); A.B Chance Co. v. RTE Corp. 854 F.2d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1988); E.!. Dupont De Nemours
& Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 849 F.2d 1430 (Fed Cir. 1988); Buildex Inc. v. Kason Indus.,
Inc., 849 F.2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Andrew Corp. v. Gabriel Elec., Inc., 847 F.2d 819 (Fed.
Cir. 1988); Specialty Composites v. Cabot Corp., 845 F.2d 981 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Grain Processing
Corp. v. American Maize-Products Co., 840 F.2d 902 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Allen Organ Co. v. Kimball lnt'l, Inc, 839 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
102. A.B Chance Co. v. RTE Corp. 854 F.2d 1307 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Buildex Inc. v. Kason
Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
103. These reversal rates are high compared to the reversal rates on non-inequitable conduct
issues suggested by other commentators. See Schwab, supra note 60.
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The reversal rates in 1988 were not substantially different from
previous years combined. 104 However, the substance of the reversals in
the cases of Manitowoc and Harita will have a long lasting effect on
the application of the inequitable conduct doctrine. 1011

C.

The Effect of FMC and Harita on PTO Policy

The CAFC decisions in FMC and Harita have had a dramatic
effect on the PTO's long-standing policy on inequitable conduct. As a
result of these decisions and suggestions from private sector groups/ 06
the PTO has decided that it will no longer investigate and reject original or reissue patent applications for inequitable conduct under 37
C.F.R 1.56. 107 This decision was made despite mounting political pressure to codify the infringement defense of inequitable conduct in 37
C.F.R. 108 The PTO notice states:
Determination of inequitable conduct issues requires an evaluation of
the intent of the party involved. While some court decisions have held
that intent may be inferred in some circumstances, consideration of
the good faith of the party, or lack thereof, is often required. In sev-

eral recent court decisions a high level of proof of intent to mislead
the Office was required in order to prove inequitable conduct under
37 C.F.R. 1.56. Harita; FMC [emphasis added; full citations
omitted]. 109
104. This indicates that the decisions, at least in result, have been consistent.
105. This is evidenced from the PTO's reaction to these cases. See infra text accompanying
notes I 06-111.
106. The standards for judging inequitable conduct before the PTO dominated the business
session of the American Bar Association's Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law at the
ABA 's annual meeting in Toronto in August, 1988. Among the resolutions passed by the Section
was one favoring deference, by the PTO, to the federal courts in "all determinations, except in
disciplinary proceedings, of whether there has been a violation of any duty of disclosure established in Title 37 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1 " Proposed Resolution 403-1 on
Duty of Disclosure, ABA SEc. PAT., TRADEMARK & CoPYRI(;HT L. CoMM. REP., 252, 253
(19fl8)
107. See United States Patent Office, OFF. GAz. (October 11, 1988).
I 08. See House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties and the Administration of Justice, testimony heard on HR 4086 (May 1988).
109. See Cnited States Patent Office, Off. Gaz. (Ortober 11, 1988). The office does not handle live testimony or participation by adverse parties, as the court can. The courts are also in a
better position to fashion equitable remedies.
The PTO, on March 17, 1989, proposed a new rule 57 to replace rule 5(, on the duty of
disclosure. It includes a "but for" standard of materiality, specific deadlines for submitting
mandatory disclosure statements, and a fee of $200 for disclosure statements filed more than three
months, with some exceptions, after the applicable date. Additionally, the new rule provides that
the PTO will make no evaluation of compliance with the duty of disclosure except in reissue
applications and disciplinary proceedings. For a more detailed summary of the new rule 57
ramifications, see Duty of Disclosure and Practitioner Misconduct, 54 Fed. Reg. 11,334 ( 1989) (to
be codified in 37 C.F.R.)(proposed March 17, 1989).
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Because of the evaluation necessary to decide an inequitable conduct issue, the PTO added, "[ t ]he Office is not the best forum in which
to determine whether there was an 'intent to mislead.' " 110 It explained
that the PTO would no longer examine or comment on inequitable
conduct issues. The PTO replaced the present 37 C.F.R. 1.56 requirement that applicants submit information which a "reasonable examiner" would consider important in deciding whether to allow a patent,
with a new requirement to submit information "when an individual
knows or should have known that the information would render unpatentable any pending claim in an application." 111
It is not known whether this action taken by the PTO will act in
accord with the CAFC's decisions in reducing litigation costs. The
PTO's action may cause parties to adjudicate some of their claims at
the administrative level and then turn to the courts to adjudicate claims
like inequitable conduct charges. This may increase litigation costs
through duplication of effort. It is likely that the hard-line approach of
the CAFC will deter any frivolous claims.

D.

Consequences of a Higher Threshold for Intent

As a consequence of the heightened intent threshold, the number
of frivolous claims of inequitable conduct will be reduced. In the past,
inequitable conduct was frequently raised by parties with the view that
it would do no harm to at least try to satisfy the minimal requirements
to support a claim. There has been every incentive for the defendant to
make such allegations. Four considerations support the position that
these claims will be reduced.
First, a court's finding of inequitable conduct completely invalidates the patent. With low requirements of proof to satisfy such a defense, a party will always try for the "knock-out" rather than suing to
get only part of the patent to be held invalid. The higher level of proof
will discourage this strategy.
Second, the possibility of being awarded attorney's fees on the basis of the patentee's inequitable conduct has previously been too attractive to ignore with the low threshold of proof. 112 Courts normally cannot award the winning party any part of his legal expenses other than
some limited costs. With the higher intent threshold, alleged infringers
will likely use other approaches before they allege a fraud defense. 113
110. /d.
Ill. /d.
112. See 35 US C. § 288 (1982).
113. The frequent invocation of FED. R. CIV. P. 11, used in conjunction with the higher
intent standard for inequitable conduct. will accentuate this result.
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This in turn should reduce patent procurement costs overall. 114
Third, the low intent threshold of the past provided defendants
with an easy way to discover the work-product of their adversaries. To
adequately counter an inequitable conduct defense, attorneys for the
patentee frequently had to present documents which otherwise would
have been protected under the work-product doctrine or under the attorney-client privilege. The heightened intent standard substantially
forecloses this avenue.
Fourth, there will be fewer cases where truly meritorious patents
are declared unenforceable because of a successful inequitable conduct
claim. The rules regarding the duty of disclosure to the PTO generally
benefit patent procurement by providing the patent examiner with the
most pertinent prior art, often known only to the patent applicant.
However, if the rules are construed in such a way that a simple good
faith mistake will invalidate a worthwhile patent, the loss of the patent
outweighs any benefit gained from the disclosure rules. By tightening
the intent standard in requiring that the patent applicant have the actual intent to mislead the PTO, the protection of patents will increase
and the public will directly benefit through the stimulation of incentive
to commercialize useful patentable inventions.
Perhaps most importantly, the higher intent threshold may help
change the focus of many patent cases. In these cases, the concentration
will be on trying the merits of the invention rather than concentrating
predominantly on the ethics or morals of the patentee or the patentee's
attorney. This is not to say that there should not be cases that concentrate predominantly on the morals or ethics of those involved in the
patent process. It is to point out that the higher intent standard may
help courts realize that they "should not so emphasize morals or ethics
as to forget the [primary purposes of the patent system]." 1111 The standard will ensure that the interests of preventing fraud on the PTO and
of promoting useful art and technology are more adequately balanced.

III.

CoNCLUSION

In the past, most U.S. patent infringement actions also included the
defendant's allegation that the patent holder acquired the patent

114. Defending an inequitable conduct defense unquestionably adds to the cost of litigation; a
reduction of the number of these defenses alleged will reduce the overall costs associated with
patent procurement. A significant cost decrease may make patents available to more people. An
expensive process will only be accessible by the rich or by large businesses. This will also promote
the constitutional purpose of the patent system.
115. See supra note 62.
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through some form of inequitable conduct. 116 The defendant had everything to gain and nothing to lose by this action. The CAFC decisions of
FMC and Harita will limit this practice by favoring the strict application of the intent element. The decisions have reduced and will continue to reduce patent litigation cost and will allow patent law to develop in line with its constitutional purposes. The new intent standard
will reduce the uncertainty that has heretofore encouraged litigators to
make charges of inequitable conduct. It will allow for more uniformity
in patent law, one of the congressional purposes behind the creation of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Most importantly, it will
more fully satisfy the purposes of the patent system-to promote science and invention for the benefit of the nation and, in addition, continue to protect the public interest in maintaining the patent process
free of fraud.

Kenneth S. Barrow

116. Many of these cases have been successful. See supra notes 82, 84, 87, 89.

